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ABSTRACT 
 
The study examines whether there is a significant relationship between risk-adjusted returns and the 
intensity of exclusion and norms-based screening. The approaches to socially responsible investing 
adopted by mutual funds in the Swedish premium pension system are quantified and the monthly 
performances over the three year period March 2011 – March 2014 are estimated with Jensen’s alpha, 
Carhart’s four-factor alpha and the Sharpe ratio. The results show significant advantages of applying 
nine out of twelve applicable screens to the socially responsible investment strategy when Jensen’s 
alpha and the Sharpe ratio are measurements of performance. The relationship is quadratic with a 
diminishing positive effect and is ascribed to a trade-off between Portfolio Theory and Stakeholder 
Theory. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background 
 
Since its first broad introduction in the 1960’s, the public awareness of sustainability has 
steadily increased as documented by The International Institute for Sustainable Development 
(2012). The trend is largely spread over a variety of business areas and many leading 
organisations and leaders of the world focus extensively on environmental issues and 
possible sustainable solutions. A common verdict is that something has to be done to reduce 
the depletion of non-renewable resources and somehow the costs of externalities have to be 
compensated. The message is expanding to the financial world and the Generation 
Foundation, by many considered being the frontrunner sustainable investment fund 
proclaimed “sustainability research integrated into a rigorous traditional investment process 
will deliver superior long term results”. Chairman Al Gore further stated, “Integrating issues 
such as climate change into investment analysis is simply common sense”. However, despite 
these fine words there is scepticism towards socially responsible investing (SRI) and the 
question remains whether these investments can deliver superior risk-adjusted returns. 
 
SRI is a topic difficult to quantify and research has shown that there are substantial 
challenges in performing SRI studies. A common belief has developed that socially 
responsible investing often leads to inferior returns and compared to conventional investing 
the investment style has therefore not been looked at as an attractive investment choice, as 
stated by Shröder (2004) and Bauer, Koedijk & Otten (2005). However, researchers from 
Maastricht University, Riedl & Smeets (2014), argue that the reasons for choosing socially 
responsible investing could be explained by factors other than only financial performance and 
they define responsible investing as individually biased in terms of expected return and risk 
perception. In fact, Bollen (2007) found that investors are likely not to hold on to badly 
performing conventional mutual funds while socially responsible investors tend to hold on to 
badly performing SRI mutual funds. Previous research indicates that people do care about 
other elements except for financial performance, which makes it clear that SRI is associated 
with irrational economic utility maximisation and varying individual preferences.  
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In the study “Social Identification and Investment Decisions” by Bauer & Smeets (2013), 
evidence was found that portfolio choice is driven by intrinsic social values and that social 
reputation might be a factor affecting investment choices. The asset selection process is 
linked to individual investor preferences more than solely to risk-return expectations; 
altruism and social norms are thus proven to be powerful elements in decision-making (Fehr 
& Fischbacher, 2003). There are retail investors who put value in avoiding investing in 
unethical or irresponsible companies. SRI can thus be desirable without expecting superior 
returns if the investor considers the reduced negative externalities to be worth the price. 
However, investors without such strong preferences for SRI might also pursue responsible 
investments if the financial benefits are strong enough.  
 
Stuart Hart, Professor of Management at Cornell University, argues that doing business 
globally is clearly in a changing phase and he anticipates that economic and industrial change 
will be driven by sustainable development over the next 25 years. If the prediction is realised, 
it is important to develop the research and investigate methods for evaluating SRI mutual 
fund performance. Essentially, SRI is “ethical investments, responsible investments, 
sustainable investments, and any other investment process that combines investors’ financial 
objectives with their concerns about environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues” as 
defined by Eurosif, the European Sustainable Investment Forum. ESG Managers®, a 
Morningstar initiative, has put together a summary of ESG companies’ activities and 
potential economic gains, shown in Table 1. 
 
There are typically two types of goals in ethical investing, the economic rational goal of 
wealth-maximisation and the goal of taking social responsibility. According to Eurosif’s 
European SRI Study from 2012, the six most commonly used approaches for SRI are 
exclusion of companies based on certain criteria e.g. specific sectors, excluding based on 
breaches against international norms, engaging and influencing regarding ESG matters, 
selecting only best-in-class investments based on ESG criteria, integrating ESG factors into 
the financial analysis and finally, investing with the purpose of developing sustainability. The 
Swedish market has been on the forefront of socially responsible investing for many years 
and data on the Swedish market breakdown by SRI strategy, shown in Table 2, illustrates that 
the focus lies on exclusion and norms-based screening.  
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Table 2: Swedish market breakdown by SRI strategy, Eurosif (2012) 
SRI Strategy Millions of SEK Percentages 
Exclusion Screening  3 030 607 39.59 % 
Norms-Based Screening  2 313 365 30.22 % 
Engagement and Voting  1 227 928 16.04 % 
Best-In-Class  768 314 10.04 % 
Integration of ESG  311 284 4.07 % 
Sustainability Themed  3 532 0.05 % 
 
Table 1: ESG companies’ activities and gains, ESG Managers® (2014) 
Area of focus Activity Potential impact on financial 
performance 
Environment 
- Resource management and pollution 
prevention 
- Reduced emissions and climate 
impact 
- Environmental reporting/disclosure 
- Avoid or minimise environmental 
liabilities 
- Lower costs/increase profitability 
through energy and other efficiencies 
- Reduce regulatory, litigation and 
reputational risk 
- Indicator of well-governed company 
Social 
Workplace 
- Diversity 
- Health and safety 
- Labour-Management relations 
- Human rights 
Product Integrity 
- Safety 
- Product quality 
- Emerging technology issues 
 
Community Impact 
- Community relations 
- Responsible lending 
- Corporate philanthropy 
Workplace 
- Improved productivity and morale 
- Reduce turnover and absenteeism 
- Openness to new ideas and 
innovation 
- Reduce potential for litigation and 
reputational risk 
Product Integrity 
- Create brand loyalty 
- Increase sales based on products 
safety and excellence 
- Reduce potential for litigation 
- Reduce reputational risk 
Community Impact 
- Improve brand loyalty 
- Protect license to operate 
Corporate 
Governance 
- Executive compensation 
- Board accountability 
- Shareholder rights 
- Reporting and disclosure 
- Align interests of shareowners and 
management 
- Avoid negative financial surprises or 
“blow-ups” 
- Reduce reputational risk 
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1.2. Purpose and Contribution 
 
The purpose is to study the historical relationship between mutual funds’ intensity in their 
SRI approach and their risk-adjusted return. Drawing conclusions as to what the optimal 
level of exclusion and norms-based screening intensity was during the period March 2011 – 
March 2014 could help establish a reference base for further research. Future research may 
become extensive enough to be used as indicators for predictions, providing useful guidelines 
for retail investors wishing to understand the impact on returns from differences in SRI 
approaches between mutual funds.  
 
The study ‘Beyond Dichotomy...’ by Barnett & Salomon (2006) emphasises that SRI mutual 
funds are not homogenous, and if a foundation is to be laid out for investors aiming at 
investing responsibly, Capelle-Blancard & Monjon (2012) states “The debate on the 
economic and financial impact of corporate social responsibility should move away from the 
question “does it pay to be good?” to “when does it pay to be good?” 
 
The contribution of this study is to highlight and quantify the varying characteristics of SRI 
practices on the Swedish market in order study the impact of common SRI approaches, 
providing guidance as to the optimal screening intensity for maximising performance.  
 
1.3. Research Questions 
 
The question of interest is whether the number of exclusion and norms-based screening 
criteria employed by fund managers had an impact on risk-adjusted performance during the 
sample period. The reason behind focusing on negative screening is because exclusion and 
norms-based screening criteria make up almost 70 % of the market divided by strategy as 
previously shown in table 2, and is thus the most widely applied method for Swedish SRI 
fund managers.  
 
Drawing inspiration from previous studies, allowing for a better fitting model and realising 
that there might be a turning point in the SRI screening process where its effect either starts 
to be realised or begins to decline, a curvilinear relationship is the main hypothesis, resulting 
in the following three hypotheses. 
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I. There is a quadratic relationship between the number of exclusion and norms-based 
screening criteria and risk-adjusted return, when measured as the estimated Jensen’s 
alpha. 
II. There is a quadratic relationship between the number of exclusion and norms-based 
screening criteria and risk-adjusted return, when measured as the estimated 
Carhart’s four-factor alpha. 
III. There is a quadratic relationship between the number of exclusion and norms-based 
screening criteria and risk-adjusted return, when measured as the Sharpe ratio. 
 
Furthermore, the impact of individual screens, whether the fund engages in positive screening 
and more, are discussed but not extensively explored, as it is not the main research question. 
 
1.4. Delimitations 
 
Since there is far from any consensus on how externalities should be priced, conventional 
financial measures of performance are employed in the study. After deciding on the focus of 
the thesis, limitations mostly lie in the size of the data sample. The mutual funds examined 
are restricted to those included in “Hållbarhetsprofilen”, which is an online database with 
information and guidelines concerning the asset selection process employed by managers of 
SRI mutual funds, the structure of the framework will be further discussed in the 
methodology section. Since information is not available on whether the mutual funds listed in 
“Hållbarhetsprofilen” applied the SRI practices before the introduction of the framework, a 
compromise had to be done between either assuming unchanged SRI approaches among the 
mutual funds to study a longer time period, or shortening the time frame in order to minimise 
the risk of changed SRI approaches over the years. The resulting sample period for measuring 
fund performance are the 36 months ranging from March 2011 – March 2014 and it is 
assumed that the funds’ SRI approach remained the same, or at least similar enough not to 
affect inference. 
 
Even though the ethical board of mutual fund marketing (“Etiska Nämnden för 
Fondmarknadsföring”) perform audits and have stated guidelines of what is needed to market 
a fund as socially responsible, there is no strict regulation. Examining and quantifying the 
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screening process is a step further than simply classifying a fund as SRI or non-SRI, but it is 
difficult to know how seriously the policies presented to stakeholders actually are applied in 
the operational work.  One could argue that this investigation somewhat becomes a study of 
the relationship between performance and stated ambitions of screening intensity. 
 
To fully judge whether an investment is a good addition to an existing portfolio, covariance 
properties and the final exposure to systematic risk are important to consider. It is therefore 
difficult to make recommendations of an optimal mutual fund as the evaluation is dependent 
on the individual portfolio composition. 
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2. THEORY & LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The theoretical background for the methodology lies in portfolio theory and the pricing 
models the theory has brought forward as well as stakeholder theory because it appears as an 
explanatory theory in many previous SRI studies. The results of the earlier and most 
prominent papers are shortly summarised. 
 
2.1. Portfolio Theory 
 
Portfolio Theory, presented by Markowitz (1952), builds on the idea of combining assets to 
form a portfolio with the highest possible return given a certain amount of risk, or 
respectively, minimising the risk given the level of expected return. Risk is defined as 
standard deviation of returns and the theory relies on the mathematical proof that diversifying 
across assets lowers the overall risk compared to investing only in an individual asset. When 
the number of assets in the portfolio is large enough, dependent on their correlation 
characteristics, the idiosyncratic risk linked to a specific company is essentially eliminated 
and only the systematic risk affecting the global market remains.  
 
When an additional asset is considered for a well-diversified portfolio, its covariance 
properties with the portfolio is of main focus as it increases or decreases the exposure to the 
systematic risk. Whether the specific risks of the assets are high or low is not of interest since 
the risk is diversified away and it is only how the asset are correlated that matters. It is 
assumed that investors are rational, non-satiated and risk-averse so that in choosing between 
portfolios higher return and lower risk is always preferred. 
 
By estimating return, standard deviation and how assets correlate it is possible to weigh 
assets in a portfolio that minimises variance, this gives rise to a set of mean-variance efficient 
portfolios. If the investable universe is restricted, the number of assets that have favourable 
covariance properties with the portfolio will decrease and this could worsen the trade-off 
between expected return and standard deviation for the available set of portfolios. The reward 
of increasing risk with another unit of standard deviation can be measured with the Sharpe 
ratio, also referred to as reward-to-variability ratio. 
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2.1.1. Pricing models 
 
An approach for studying whether an asset such as a mutual fund has performed worse or 
better than they ought to, given their risk factor sensitivities, is to compare actual returns with 
the theoretically fair returns derived from factor pricing models. Two measurements of this 
abnormal return are used in the thesis, Jensen’s alpha from the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) and alpha from Carhart’s four-factor model. 
 
CAPM is an approach for estimating the appropriate discount rate used for pricing an asset’s 
future cash flows. It builds upon the assumption that the portfolio is already well diversified, 
so for an asset with desirable covariance properties, the method to determine the appropriate 
level of expected return is to estimate the asset’s β, the sensitivity to fluctuations in the 
market, in other words, the exposure to systematic risk. The reasoning is that holding a risky 
asset and bearing the risk of the market should be rewarded beyond the risk-free rate and the 
premium for this exposure is the excess return of the market, [E(Rm) - Rf]. With figures on the 
risk-free rate, the factor sensitivity and the return of the market it is then possible to 
statistically estimate the expected rate of return with equation (1). 
 
 !(!!) = !!! + !!![!(!!) − !!!] ( 1 ) 
 
To allow for the possibility that there are more risk factors than market risk that is of 
importance when determining the appropriate level of expected return, Carhart (1997) built 
upon the work of Fama and French (1993) and developed a four-factor model. Factors 
considered are market risk, size, book-to-market ratio of companies and momentum of stock 
prices. The coefficients are estimated for each individual fund by performing an ordinary 
least squares regression with model (2).  
 
 !! = !!!"#!!"# + !! !!,! − !!!,! + !!×!!"#! + ℎ!×! "#! + ! !×! "#! + !!!  ( 2 ) 
 
Where Rt is excess return, αcarhart is the intercept, the abnormal return. The coefficients b, s, h 
and w are factor loadings for the corresponding risk factor premiums rm-rf, SMB, HML and 
WML. SMB (Small Minus Big) represents the performance of small stocks minus the 
performance of big stocks, HML (High Minus Low) is the difference in performance between 
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value and growth stocks as derived from their book-to-market ratio, WML (Winners Minus 
Losers) represents the momentum factor, it is the performance of winner stocks relative to 
loser stocks on an equally-weighted portfolio of small and big companies. The risk factor 
premiums are estimated by constructing factor-mimicking portfolios.  
 
2.1.2. Efficient Market Hypothesis 
 
An essential assumption of portfolio theory is that the market is efficient, meaning that there 
is no systematic mispricing of assets that can be profitably exploited on a regular basis. Fama 
(1970) defined three subsets of how security prices reflect all available information and 
adjust rapidly when new information is available. The three forms of market efficiency are 
called weak, semi-strong and strong form. In the weak form prices reflect all historical price- 
and volume information, in the semi-strong form also all publicly available information is 
reflected in prices and in the strong form even private, insider information is reflected in the 
market price. To allow for the possibility that superior analysis can lead to superior risk-
adjusted returns on a regular basis after deducting the costs associated with gathering this 
additional information, the semi-strong (and the strong) form of the market efficiency 
hypothesis must be rejected.  
 
2.2. Stakeholder Theory 
 
In the Journal of Business Ethics, Miles (2012) stated the fundamental question of 
stakeholder theory as “who or what really counts” and that stakeholder management, holding 
other things equal, will enhance conventional corporate performance in terms of stability and 
growth. Stakeholders are defined as people or groups with sincere interest in a corporation’s 
activities, e.g. shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, governments, competitors and 
trade enhancing alliances. A further addition is that stakeholder theory can describe how 
cooperative and competitive benefits are connected to financial corporate goals and how 
these constellations of relationships possess value to the firm (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). 
 
Michael Jensen (2002) stated “A firm cannot maximise value if it ignores the interest of its 
stakeholders”. Active socially responsible fund managers try to influence the management of 
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firms in order to enhance the firms’ ethical operations and these fund managers often use 
their voting rights and keep a dialogue with the firms’ management since they most likely 
believe the time and effort put into these actions will increase the value of the investment.  
 
Jensen (2002) questioned the recognised idea of value maximisation as well as stakeholder 
theory, when applied on their own, claiming that the former is among other things incapable 
of conveying a vision or purpose to participants in an organisation. The argument against 
practicing stakeholder theory on its own is that it does not sufficiently specify how to 
prioritise stakeholder interests in decision-making or how to assess performance. He further 
claimed that stakeholder theory “plays into the hands of special interests that wish to use the 
resources of corporations for their own ends”. The suggested link between the two concepts 
is named ”enlightened stakeholder theory”, with one of the central principles being “We 
cannot maximise the long-term market value of an organisation if we ignore or mistreat any 
important constituency”.  
 
Socially responsible fund managers engaging with companies in their portfolio may believe 
the activities will create and uncover value and that recognising environmental, social and 
governance factors enhances the value maximisation potential of firms. If the fund manager 
is ahead of the rest of the market in this aspect, value can be found before the information is 
reflected in the price, a reasoning supported by Jensen; “I say “long-term” market value to 
recognize the possibility that financial markets, although forward looking, may not 
understand the full implications of a company’s policies until they begin to show up in cash 
flows over time. In such cases, management must communicate to investors the policies’ 
anticipated effect on value, and then wait for the market to catch up and recognize the real 
value of its decisions as reflected in increases in market share, customer and employee 
loyalty, and, finally, cash flows.”  
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2.3. Literature Review 
 
Much of previous research in the field has compared conventional fund performance to 
socially responsible fund performance to examine whether ethical investors pay a price for 
applying responsible policies to their investment strategies. The results among researchers 
differ and different methodological processes have been used in order to find a superior way 
of evaluating SRI mutual funds. Many researchers have investigated individual countries 
when evaluating SRI fund performance. Goldreyer & Diltz (1999) and Statman (2000) 
present results from mutual funds in the US and show that the difference between SRI and 
non-SRI mutual fund performance is not statistically different from zero. Moreover, Luther et 
al. (1992) Mallin et al. (1995) and Gregory et al. (1997) found similar results when they 
assessed SRI mutual fund performance in the UK. Bauer, Otten & Tourani Rad (2006) and 
Bauer, Derwall & Otten (2006) reached similar conclusions when evaluating SRI mutual 
fund performance in Canada and Australia. However, Geczy, Stanbaugh & Levin (2003) 
found results that the mean-variance optimisation was impaired by adding constraints when 
they examined socially responsible investments from the perspective of an investor who is 
only interested in US equity mutual funds with the highest Sharpe ratios.  
 
Another approach that is frequently conducted related to SRI performance is multi-country 
analyses. Bauer et al. (2005) deeply studied US, UK and German mutual funds and Schröder 
(2004) performed studies on US, Swiss and German SRI mutual funds. Neither of these 
studies found any statistically differing results for conventional and SRI mutual fund 
performance. Renneboog, Ter Horst & Zhang (2008) contributed to the field of research by 
extensively studying the performance of nearly all SRI mutual funds in Europe, North 
America and Asia-Pacific over a longer time frame than most previous research on the topic 
and reached to the conclusion that France, Sweden, Ireland and Japan were the countries that 
significantly differed negatively from the performance of conventional mutual funds. 
 
Barnett & Salomon (2006) published findings of a curvilinear, U-shaped relationship 
between the intensity of the socially responsible screening process and financial performance. 
They found a negative effect of additional negative screens but as more of these constraints 
are added to the portfolio, the relationship turns positive to almost reach the initial level of 
return for funds applying no screens at all. Their reasoning for the existence of a U-shaped 
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relationship was that mutual funds with low levels of screening intensity can still be well 
diversified and stay close to the mean-variance efficient frontier. Those mutual funds with 
high levels of screening intensity may suffer from not being fully diversified but are possibly 
compensated by the advantages of only investing in companies with high socially responsible 
standards, resulting in positive stakeholder relationships. Mutual funds that apply mid-level 
screening intensities will neither hold a mean-variant efficient portfolio nor a portfolio with 
enough investments in regard to high SRI quality.  
 
The existence of a quadratic relationship is an occurrence that Lee, Humphrey, Benson & 
Ahn (2010) looked into as well in the article “Socially responsible investment fund 
performance: the impact on screening intensity”. They did not observe any statistically 
significant results for a quadratic relationship with performance as Barnett & Salomon did, 
but they did however find a similar relationship when several different measures of risk were 
used as dependent variables.  
 
As described, varying results have been found and different methodologies and data samples 
have been used. Most studies evaluate performance using the CAPM to determine whether 
there is a difference between conventional mutual fund performance to SRI mutual fund 
performance and plenty of research also employed Carhart’s four-factor model by including 
the additional risk factors size, book-to-market and momentum. 
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3. DATA & METHODOLOGY 
 
Despite drawing inspiration and guidance from esteemed papers in the area of research, the 
process of performing an empirical analysis is an ambiguous one and adjustments, 
assumptions and limitations have to be done along the way. To make this study possible to 
recreate for further developments, the data sources, approaches, issues and solutions are 
described starting with how the sample was selected, followed by the definition of screening 
intensity, explanations on how the various dependent variables of risk-adjusted return were 
estimated, which control variables are included and how the model for estimating the effect 
of screening intensity was defined and used.  
 
In order to increase our understanding and especially forming a perception of how SRI is 
performed in practice, the research was initiated with an interview at the “Second AP Fund”. 
Christina Olivecrona, responsible for sustainable investments and Jonas Eixmann, 
responsible for Swedish equities were of great help in improving our understanding of the 
topic, the focus of the study however lies in the quantitative analysis and the interview 
primarily served as an inspirational source. 
 
3.1.  Sample Selection 
 
The starting point for gathering data on the different ways of approaching socially 
responsible investing in Sweden was the framework ”Hållbarhetsprofilen”. It is an initiative 
brought forward in 2011 by Swesif, the Swedish Sustainable Investment Forum, which is a 
sub-organisation to the international Eurosif. These organisations are independent, non-profit 
networks that promote socially responsible investments. “Hållbarhetsprofilen” provides an 
online database with information and guidelines concerning the asset selection process 
employed by managers of SRI mutual funds included in the Swedish Premium Pension 
System who have opted to publish a sustainability report along with the regular financial 
reporting.  The focus of the SRI approach was placed mainly on the number of exclusion and 
norms-based screening criteria funds use, also referred to as negative screening. Eurosif 
reported in 2012 that almost 70 % of the Swedish SRI fund market is focused on this type of 
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strategy and it could be argued that the number of screens could be seen as a proxy for how 
extensively fund managers filter the investable universe in the asset selection process. 
 
As of 2014-04-05, there was information on 110 mutual funds with varying investment style 
and geographical focus in “Hållbarhetsprofilen”, for this study however, those that are not 
pure equity funds and those that have existed less than three years were excluded, resulting in 
65 Swedish SRI mutual equity funds. It would be preferable to have an even larger sample 
size, and there are funds available in the market with names such as “ethical” or “sustainable” 
that are not listed in “Hållbarhetsprofilen”. These funds could have been included, however, 
the fact that the funds in our sample report on their SRI-processes gives some verification 
that they truly act as socially responsible mutual funds. Also, unfortunately it would be too 
tedious and time-consuming for this study to contact each of these fund managers to inquire 
about their guidelines, if they would even be willing to share this information.  
 
One could imagine that if a relationship does exist between the degree of screening intensity 
and fund performance, the strength of the relationship could differ over time as the economy 
fluctuates and as the possible value or cost of SRI is more or less clear to investors dependent 
on how heavily the topic is discussed in media. It would therefore be well advised to perform 
an analysis over a longer time frame to include more observed returns and adjust for any 
seasonality or trend. However, there is no data readily available as to whether the SRI 
approach of funds in the sample has differed during the funds’ existence. Despite this lack of 
data, to enable a study of a long enough time period of returns, the assumption is made that 
funds’ processes reported in “Hållbarhetsprofilen”, since the introduction of its unified 
framework in 2011, have not changed to the extent that the changes would affect results and 
conclusions. Furthermore, SRI is a rapidly changing subject and this study primarily focuses 
on the role SRI plays in its current shape, during the period March 2011 – March 2014. 
 
Another issue caused by the lack of historical data is survivorship bias. Brown, Goetzmann, 
Ibbotson & Ross (1992) analysed the relationship between risk and return and proposed that 
past fund performance foretells future performance. They uncovered patterns of predictability 
in performance and found significant evidence for the representative heuristic “hot hands”, 
related to manager trackback and mutual fund performance. Although studies, among them 
Jensen (1968), demonstrate that future performance cannot be guaranteed, and that 
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outperforming the market on a risk-adjusted basis due to professional manager skill is rare, 
the fact remains that skilful managers may be those who survive. In line with Goetzmann and 
Ibbotson (1991), Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993) obtained strong results for that 
positive and negative performance can persist. Only including surviving funds in a sample is 
generally considered to result in upward bias as badly performing funds are those 
disappearing and the relatively worse performance is thus neglected in the analysis. However, 
one should be careful in what conclusions to draw about survivorship bias. Mutual funds that 
disappear may not necessarily have performed badly; funds with similar investment styles are 
often merged as a consequence of desiring a more specific and clear fund investment 
objective.  
 
To investigate whether funds have disappeared from “Hållbarhetsprofilen” since its inception 
in 2011, an administrator at Swesif was contacted and unfortunately there are no such records 
available. Relying on previous studies by Renneboog et al. (2008) and Barnett & Salomon 
(2006) who tested for survivorship bias within SRI mutual funds and found that the attrition 
rate of SRI mutual funds was very low, the matter was not further explored in this study and 
we chose to examine the funds’ performance over a three-year period to minimise the risk of 
survivorship bias. 
 
3.2. Fund Managers’ Screening Intensity 
 
In contrast to the corresponding SRI-framework in the US, different types of screens being 
used by funds are not readily divided into “checkbox categories”, but instead the SRI-
processes are described freely under specified headlines. To make this qualitative data 
quantitative for analysis purposes, the information on processes was narrowed down to 
twelve distinct categories of negative screens; alcohol, tobacco, gambling, pornography, oil, 
military equipment and weapons, inhuman weapons (i.e. chemical, nuclear), corruption, 
pollution, child labour, violated labour rights and human rights. The number of screens a fund 
manager takes into account when excluding companies were noted for each fund. Six of the 
funds do not list any negative screening criteria and those were regarded as not engaging in 
negative screening. Although they simply use a different approach, for example restraining 
possible investments to only those selected for sustainable best-in-class indices, where one 
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could assume many negative screens are in fact taken into account, including the funds would 
distort the results of the applied method. The sample was thus reduced to 65 funds. 
 
Many mutual funds do not only use negative screening criteria to exclude companies but also 
select companies based on that they actively work with trying to improve operations 
concerning environmental and social issues, and some follow a theme such as only investing 
in companies from an industry sector that is considered to be developing sustainability, i.e. 
clean energy. To account for the impact these activities could have on fund performance 
these two matters were noted as dummy variables for positive screening and theme investing 
respectively. Furthermore, a dummy was defined for whether the fund uses their proxy voting 
right on shareholders’ meetings since this could be seen as an indication that fund managers 
try to generate change and engage with portfolio companies’ board and management.   
 
3.3.  Fund performance 
 
To calculate each funds monthly return for the 36 months ranging from 2011-03-31 to 2014-
03-31, end-of-month closing prices for 37 months were gathered via Bloomberg and the 
month over month percentage return was calculated. In order to have comparable measures of 
return, the fact that the funds take on different levels of risk exposure is taken into account 
with three measures; Jensen’s alpha (1968), alpha from Carhart’s four-factor model (1997) 
and the Sharpe ratio (1966).  
 
3.3.1. Jensen’s alpha 
 
When estimating coefficients of the CAPM for each of the funds, the intercept is the main 
parameter of interest as it measures the rate of return that either exceeds or falls short of what 
the “fair return” should have been when market risk is the only factor taken into account.  
 
 !! = !!!"#$ + !!! !!,! − !!!,! + !!!  ( 3 ) 
 
In the model Rt is excess return of the fund in month t, αCAPM is the intercept and hence the 
Jensen’s alpha, b is the factor loading, rm is the return of the market and rf the risk-free rate, εt 
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are the residuals from the fitted model.  The model was estimated for each of the 65 funds in 
the sample by regressing excess return in the 36 months t on the excess market return from 
the market in the corresponding region. The historical factors of market risk and the risk-free 
rates were downloaded from Kenneth French’s Data Library. 
 
3.3.2. Carhart’s four-factor alpha 
 
To allow for the possibility that more than the exposure to systematic risk of the market is 
taken into account, a regression for each of the funds with Carhart’s four-factor model is used 
that includes factors to account for size of assets, book-to-market ratio and momentum in 
prices. 
 
 !! = !!!"#!!"# + !!! !!,! − !!!,! + !!×!!"#! + ℎ!×! "#! + ! !×! "#! + !!!  ( 4 ) 
 
Where Rt is excess return, αcarhart is the intercept, the abnormal return, i.e. the parameter of 
interest. The coefficients b, s, h, and w are factor loadings for the corresponding risk factors 
of market exposure (rm-rf), size (SMB), book-to-market ratio (HML) and momentum (WML).  
 
The Kenneth French Data Library provides estimated factor premiums for markets in Asia 
Pacific excluding Japan, Europe, Japan, and North America as well as for a global portfolio. 
We assigned each fund to one of these regions based on where the majority of their 
investments are held and then regressed on the matching set of factors to increase the 
accuracy of the factor loading estimations. The consistency gained from gathering data on 
factors from the same source is advantageous for inference purposes as the data were 
estimated with the same methodological process. 
 
As both of these regression models’ dependent variable is the excess return of the fund, the 
US 1-month Treasury bill rate from the corresponding month was subtracted from each of the 
previously calculated returns. The reason for using the US T-bill rate is that it is the one 
applied by Fama and French when estimating the risk premiums and using the same rate 
provides uniformity. Furthermore, with the notion of global financial markets, the US T-bill 
rate is often considered as the risk-free benchmark rate (Ma, Tchen, Smith & MacNamara, 
2011).  
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Both of the regressions (3) and (4), with the resulting estimations of intercepts to be used as 
the dependent variables later on in main model (6), were estimated with the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) method. Many of the estimates for both Jensen’s alpha and Carhart’s four-
factor alpha are insignificant when examined with a standard t-test, possibly a consequence 
of the time frame limitation in sample size, along with the randomness often observed in 
asset prices. A way of addressing this problem was presented by Chan & Faff (2003) as they 
recorded the standard errors of these estimates and used them as weights in a Weighted Least 
Squares (WLS) regression in the main model investigating the impact of screening intensity.  
This approach was tested but as it changed the inferences on several points, since it is 
recommended to avoid setting weights if uncertain, and as it was not employed by neither 
Barnett & Salomon (2006) nor Renneboog et al. (2008), the OLS method was relied on and 
the WLS results will not be reported. 
 
3.3.3. Sharpe Ratio 
 
When discussing factor-pricing models it is often assumed that only systematic, or factor 
risks are rewarded in the form of risk premiums. However, Malkiel and Xu (1997) argued 
that idiosyncratic risk is also rewarded. To allow for the possibility that idiosyncratic risk 
actually do have an impact on performance we include the funds’ Sharpe ratios (1966) as 
another measurement of performance as it takes standard deviation into account and therefore 
is a measurement of performance relative to total risk.  
 
 !"! = !!! − !!!!  ( 5 ) 
 
Here ri – rf is the average excess return over the 36 months and σi is the standard deviation of 
the excess returns. The Sharpe ratio is a measure of the excess return rewarded for each 
additional unit of standard deviation and is widely used when evaluating mutual fund 
performance. Since the Sharpe ratio is equal to the slope of the capital allocation line where 
investors theoretically choose between the risk-free asset and the optimal risky portfolio it is 
a good measure for examining how negative screens affect the risk-reward characteristics of 
the optimal risky portfolio. 
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3.4. Control Variables 
 
Three control variables for fund characteristics are included in main model (6) to account for 
the impact that age, size and fee might have on performance. Age is measured in months 
since the funds’ inception date up until April 2014, it accounts for the plausible learning 
effect of fund managers. Size is the total assets under management measured in millions of 
SEK as of 2014-03-31. The variable is included due to the advantages and disadvantages 
linked to managing large amounts of assets. Fee is the stated annual management fee in 
percentages and retrieved 2014-04-03. 
 
When downloading data on control variables some values were not available from 
Bloomberg and those were instead gathered via Morningstar. After noting some 
discrepancies between these two sources concerning fund inception date and noting that 
Morningstar was the one in line with the funds’ webpage data, Morningstar was solely relied 
on to provide data on the funds’ inception dates.  
 
3.5. Parameter Estimation 
 
For the purpose of investigating how the number of screens employed by portfolio managers 
of SRI funds relate to risk-adjusted performance, the approach used is similar to the one first 
introduced by Barnett & Salomon (2006). This approach was further developed by 
Renneboog et al. (2008) as they assessed a study of SRI-fund performance with a wider 
geographical focus, and later D.D. Lee et al. (2010) proceeded with a study building upon the 
work of Renneboog et al. (2008). To better suit our sample characteristics and data 
availability, minor adjustments in the model and a cross-sectional approach was used. 
 
 !"#$%#&'()"! = !!! + !!!×!!"#$! + !!!×!!"#$!! + !!!×!!ℎ!"!! + !!×!!"##$%!+ !!!×!!"#$! + !!!×!!"#! + !!!×!!"#$! + !!!×!!""! + !!!×!!"#!$!%!+ !!!"×!!"#$%!! + !!!!×!!"#"$! + !!!"×!!"#$ℎ!"#$%&!! + !!! ( 6 )  
 
Performancei is the dependent variable in the model with a value for each fund i, represented 
in three different regression outputs by the measures Jensen’s alpha, Carhart’s four-factor 
alpha and the Sharpe ratio. The main variable of interest, which the performance measures 
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will be regressed on, is the independent variable intyi and the variable represents the number 
of negative screens listed by each fund in “Hållbarhetsprofilen”. The possibility of a 
quadratic linear relationship was taken into account with the variable inty2i  
 
Furthermore, dummies related to the mutual funds’ SRI approach are posscri, equal to 1 if the 
fund uses positive screens to select socially responsible companies and 0 otherwise, themei, 
set to 1 if the fund has a theme investment strategy. The dummy votei has a value of 1 if the 
asset management company attends shareholder meetings and use their voting rights. 
 
The factors agei, sizei and feei are control variables and asiapaci, europei, japani and 
northamericai are dummy control variables because the funds invest in different regions. 
These dummies are included to account for regional differences in performance beyond that 
derived from the risk premiums. To prevent perfect collinearity the global mutual funds serve 
as base group, which the other mutual funds are compared to. 
 
3.5.1. Individual screens 
 
To investigate whether certain negative screens have a significant impact on performance on 
their own, the three measures of performance were also regressed on all of the negative 
screens in the form of individual dummies, set to 1 if the fund employs the screen and 0 
otherwise. 
  
 !"#$%#&'()"! = !!! + !∑!!!!" !!×!!"#$$%!,! + !!!"×!!ℎ!"!! + !!"×!!"##$%!+ !!!"×!!"#$! + !!!"×!!"#! + !!!"×!!"#$! + !!!"×!!""!+ !!!"×!!"#!$!%! + !!!"×!!"#$%!! + !!!"×!!"#"$!+ !!!!×!!"#$ℎ!"#$%&!! + !!! 
( 7 )   
  
The twelve different screens appear with their corresponding coefficients βj first in the 
regression and the remaining variables are the same as in model (6). 
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3.5.2. Heteroskedasticity 
 
The White-test showed no signs of heteroskedasticity in the regression models for any of the 
three performance measures used as dependent variables. A Breusch-Pagan test however 
rejected the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity at the 5 % significance level for all three 
measures and thus indicated that the residuals in the model might be correlated with the 
independent variables. Due to this ambiguity regarding heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors were calculated. The Eicker-Huber-White standard errors are only valid for large 
samples, but instead of judging whether the sample is large enough they are simply presented 
together with the regular standard errors. 
 
As for regressing on the individual screens, the Breusch-Pagan test showed signs of 
heteroskedasticity for all the performance measures at various significance levels, whereas 
the simple White-test pointed to heteroskedasticity only for Carhart’s four-factor alpha and 
not for Jensen’s alpha or for the Sharpe ratio. Therefore the same approach of reporting both 
regular and robust standard errors was done.   
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3.6. Summary Statistics 
 
The sample consists of 65 Swedish mutual fund observations and the summary statistics of 
all variables are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Jensen's Alpha 65 0.1257 0.4096 -1.5444 1.0939 
Carhart's Alpha 65 -0.0626 0.3995 -1.3119 1.1538 
Sharpe Ratio 65 0.1783 0.1270 -0.1320 0.4911 
 
Screening Intensity 65 8 2.1139 4 11 
Theme 65 0.0615 0.2421 0 1 
Positive Screening 65 0.3692 0.4863 0 1 
Vote 65 0.3538 0.4818 0 1 
 
Age 65 172.6154 75.7833 21 408 
Size 65 5450.289 21573.09 72.44 173497 
Fee 65 1.0127 0.5375 0.15 2 
Global 65 0.3538 0.4818 0 1 
Europa 65 0.4615 0.5023 0 1 
Japan 65 0.0461 0.2114 0 1 
Asia Pacific 65 0.0769 0.2685 0 1 
North America 65 0.0615 0.2421 0 1 
 
 
Jensen’s alpha and Carhart’s four-factor alpha are measured monthly in percentages. A 
Jensen’s alpha of one means that the mutual fund has on average returned a one percentage 
point higher return than what it was expected to, given its level of exposure to market risk by 
correlating with a wide market index in its respective region. The Sharpe ratio is the return 
gained per unit of standard deviation of returns, for example a difference in Sharpe ratio of 
0.2 between mutual funds would mean that the superior fund generated 0.2 percentage points 
higher return for each percentage point of monthly standard deviation the fund has had on 
average over the last three years. 
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4. RESULTS 
 
The results of regressing performance on screening intensity are presented and followed by 
explanations of the economical and statistical significance. To serve as additional analysis, 
the performance measures are regressed on each of the twelve individual screening criteria. 
Finally the hypotheses stated in the introduction are answered.  
 
4.1. Screening Intensity 
 
The resulting outputs from regressing performance on screening intensity as specified in 
model (6) are presented for each of the examined measures Jensen’s alpha, Carhart’s four-
factor alpha and the Sharpe ratio along with the regular and robust standard errors in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Exclusion and Norms-Based Screening Intensity 
Variable Jensen’s alpha Carhart’s alpha Sharpe Ratio 
 0.8222 0.2524 0.1316 Screening intensity (0.1941)*** (0.1944) (0.0530)** 
 [0.2430]*** [0.2732] [0.0557]** 
 -0.0481 -0.0159 -0.0077 Screening int. squared (0.0119)*** (0.0120) (0.0032)** 
 [0.0147]*** [0.0161] [0.0034]** 
 0.1650 0.0716 0.0332 Theme investing (0.1805) (0.1807) (0.0492) 
 [0.1568] [0.1490] [0.0486] 
 -0.1689 -0.1221 -0.0297 Positive screening (0.0899)* (0.0900) (0.0245) 
 [0.0909]* [0.0843] [0.0249] 
 0.0943 -0.0204 0.0053 Vote (0.0900) (0.0901) (0.0245) 
 [0.0917] [0.0897] [0.0260] 
 0.0007 0.0003 0.0002 Age (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0001) 
 [0.0006] [0.0005] [0.0002] 
 2.13e-07 -4.72e-07 1.66e-07 Size (2.00e-06) (2.00e-06) (5.45e-07) 
 [8.04e-07] [6.87e-07] [2.34e-07] 
 -0.0476 -0.0083 -0.0267 Fee (0.0826) (0.0827) (0.0225) 
 [0.0776] [0.0809] [0.0222] 
 -0.1082 -0.4794 -0.0800 Europe (0.0970) (0.0971)*** (0.0264)*** 
 [0.1048] [0.0992]*** [0.0297]*** 
 -0.5242 -0.5153 -0.2504 Japan (0.2023)** (0.2026)** (0.0552)*** 
 [0.1101]*** [0.1163]*** [0.0302]*** 
 -0.3112 -0.3190 -0.1979 Asia Pacific (0.1630)* (0.1632)* (0.0445)*** 
 [0.1259]** [0.1162]*** [0.0381]*** 
 0.4386 0.3056 0.1736 North America (0.1793)** (0.1795)* (0.0489)*** 
 [0.1107]*** [0.1162]** [0.0383]*** 
 -3.1441 -0.7461 -0.3022 Constant (0.7551)*** (0.7561) (0.2061) 
 [0.9497]*** [1.0763] [0.2061] 
R2 0.5232 0.4974 0.6306 
Results from equation (4). Standard error in ( ), robust standard errors in [ ].  
Statistically significant at: *10 %, **5 %, *** 1 % 
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4.1.1. Jensen’s alpha  
 
The variables of highest relevance for inference, screening intensity and screening intensity 
squared, provide statistically significant results when Jensen’s alpha is the performance 
measure and thus the dependent variable. Screening intensity has a positive coefficient of 
0.8222 and the output is statistically significant with both regular and robust standard errors 
at the 1% level, which is a strong indication of accurate results. The value of 0.8222 means 
that one additional screen is correlated with an increase in alpha of 0.82 percentage points in 
monthly average return over the sample period. This may seem to be of large economic value 
as it is possible to apply up to 12 different screens, however, the effect wears off due to the 
existence of a curvilinear relationship represented in the model by the squared counterpart. 
The variable screening intensity squared is statistically significant with regular and robust 
standard errors at the 1% level as well. The relatively smaller coefficient of -0.0481 indicates 
that the positive effect of screening intensity diminishes and as the number of screens 
increases the negative coefficient from the squared variable starts to have a significant 
economic impact on alpha. The main focus for analytical purposes however lies in the joint 
effect of these two variables, as there is a point where an additional screen no longer 
enhances portfolio performance.  
 
To exemplify the joint impact, applying four screens would imply 4 ∗ 0.8222+ 4! ∗−0.0481 = 2,5192  percentage points higher monthly alpha on average compared to 
employing zero screening criteria, whereas ten screens correlate with 10 ∗ 0.8222+ 10! ∗−0.0481 = 3,412 percentage points higher alpha. To employ nine screens is linked to 
3,5037 percentage points, which is a higher alpha than when ten screens are applied to the 
investment strategy. These calculations show that there is an optimal number of screens for 
maximising the fitted value of the model before the squared effect is large enough that 
refraining from applying another screen is favourable. In line with the interpretation of Figure 
1, calculating the derivative shows that the turning point lies at 8.55, in other words at nine 
negative screens.  
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Figure 1: Quadratic Relationship of Screening Intensity 
 
Figure 1 showing the quadratic relationship of screening intensity demonstrates the 
curvilinear relationship between abnormal monthly return and the number of exclusion and 
norms-based screens. To test the necessity of a quadratic relationship with screening 
intensity, a regression was performed without the squared variable. Without including the 
squared screening intensity in the regression, the coefficient of screening intensity is 0.0466 
and statistically significant at the 10% level with robust standard errors, and at the 5% level 
with regular standard errors. By including the squared variable, the model allows for a curved 
relationship instead of a linear one, R2 measuring goodness of fit increases and the observed 
result are more statistically significant. 
 
The dummy variable positive screening has a negative coefficient of -0.1689 and is 
statistically significant with regular and robust standard errors at the 10% level. The negative 
coefficient signifies a shift downwards in alpha of 0.17 percentage points. This means that 
the funds employing positive screening has on average, during our sample period, delivered 
0.17 percentage points lower abnormal return each month, given its exposure to the market, 
compared to the funds that do not use positive screening to select socially responsible assets.  
 
The regional dummy variables for Europe, Japan, Asia Pacific and North America are control 
variables to account for the regional differences in risk-adjusted performance these markets 
have had during the sample period. The coefficients for the regional variables are compared 
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to the global portfolios that serve as base group. Japan has statistically significant results at 
the 1 % significance level with regular standard errors and at 5% with robust standard errors 
and the region has a negative coefficient of -0.5242, meaning on average, 0.52 percentage 
points lower alpha each month compared to the global portfolio. Asia Pacific also 
demonstrates a negative relationship with a coefficient of -0.3112 and statistically significant 
at the 10% level with regular and robust standard errors at the 5% level, which implies a 0.13 
percentage points lower alpha than the abnormal returns of the global portfolios in the 
sample. North America is shown to have a statistically significant shift upwards in alpha of 
0.44 percentage points, as the coefficient has the positive value 0.4386, statistically 
significant with regular standard errors at the 5% level and with robust standard errors at the 
1% level. 
 
4.1.2. Carhart’s four-factor alpha 
 
When Carhart’s four-factor alpha is regressed on the same variables as Jensen’s alpha, the 
relationship between screening intensity and abnormal performance is not statistically 
significant. The coefficient of screening intensity is 0.2524, which can be considered to be of 
economic significance, the squared counterparts’ coefficient is -0.0159. These coefficients 
are however not statistically significant unless one trusts a 20 % significance level, which is 
not considered accurate enough to draw inference from.  
 
The dummy variables of the geographic regions show some significant results. Europe is 
statistically significant at the 1% level with a coefficient of -0.4794, representing a lower 
average monthly alpha of funds in Europe during the period March 2011 – March 2014 
compared to the global funds. Likewise, Japan had a negative coefficient of -0.5153 and the 
output is statistically significant at 5 % with regular standard errors and at 1 % with robust 
standard errors. Asia Pacific shows a coefficient of -0.3190, significant with regular standard 
errors at 10 % and with robust standard errors at the 1% level. Funds investing in North 
America were the only funds outperforming the global funds as the region had a higher alpha 
of 0.31 percentage points each month on average, significant at the 5 % level with robust 
standard errors and at 10 % with regular standard errors. However, these variables primarily 
serve as control variables, they are essentially a comparison of the average risk-adjusted 
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outperformance in these regions during the sample period and since they are not interacted 
with screening intensity they do not provide inference of much interest. 
 
4.1.3. Sharpe Ratio 
 
The quadratic relationship observed for Jensen’s alpha is also present for the Sharpe ratio, 
showing that additional negative screens increase the ratio of return to standard deviation, at a 
decreasing rate, and at a certain point the effect of another screen is no longer advantageous. 
An increase in the Sharpe ratio is always preferred as it implies that the returns are either 
higher, the standard deviation lower, or both. 
 
The relationship between performance and screening intensity is positive with a coefficient of 
0.1316 and statistically significant with regular and robust standard errors at the 5 % level. 
This is to be interpreted such that one more screen is highly correlated with a 0.13 percentage 
points higher Sharpe ratio. This translates into the average monthly return for each 
percentage point of standard deviation to be 0.13 percentage points higher. In line with the 
outputs from the Jensen’s alpha regression, screening intensity squared has a negative 
coefficient. It is significant at the 5 % level with regular and robust standard errors and has 
the economic value of -0.0077. This validates the negative impact that another screen starts to 
have on abnormal performance after a turning point, calculated with a derivation to occur at 
8.55 screens, in line with the results found with Jensen’s alpha. Applying nine exclusion and 
norms-based screening criteria would statistically have implied a 9 ∗ 0.1316+ !9! ∗−0.0077 = 0.5607 higher Sharpe ratio during the sample period, a notable difference, 
compared to those funds applying zero screens when keeping all else constant. 
 
As for the regional differences, all of them are statistically significant at the 1 % level, with 
both robust and regular standard errors. Europe, Japan and Asia Pacific all have negative 
coefficients of -0.08, -0.2504 and -0.1979 respectively whereas North America has a positive 
coefficient of 0.1736. 
 
In contrast to Jensen’s alpha, positive screening does not have a statistically significant 
impact on the Sharpe ratio, neither does theme investing nor the control variables age, size or 
fee for any of the three performance measurements. 
 30 
4.2. Individual Screens 
 
As the inference drawn from regressing Jensen’s alpha and the Sharpe ratio on screening 
intensity showed that nine exclusion and norms-based criteria is the optimal number of 
screens, it is of course interesting to know what nine screens are the ideal ones. To serve as 
additional analysis in this matter, the performance measures were regressed on each of the 
twelve individual exclusion and norms-based screening criteria. Their individual impacts on 
the three performance measures are presented in Table 5. In the regressions, the variable 
pollution was omitted to prevent the issue of constant variables as all of the funds employ the 
screen, and the control variables are not reported for the sake of brevity. Some significant 
results were found and the reasons to why the observed relationship exist can be 
contemplated, but in order to build a thorough conclusion in regards to the optimal set of nine 
screens, further research is needed as consideration must be given to covariance properties, 
individual preferences, variations in regions and more. 
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Table 5: Individual Negative Screens 
Variable Jensen’s alpha Carhart’s alpha Sharpe ratio 
 0.4714 0.0345 0.1767 
Alcohol (0.7869) (0.7606) (0.2078) 
 [0.5687] [0.5032] [0.1590] 
 0.6529 0.3860 0.2372 
Tobacco (0.6227) (0.6019) (0.1644) 
 [0.3898] [0.3619] [0.1184]* 
 0.0493 -0.0647 0.0020 
Gambling (0.1705) (0.1648) (0.0450) 
 [0.1988] [0.1670] [0.0530] 
 0.6488 0.5077 0.1383 
Pornography (0.1714)*** (0.1656)*** (0.0452)*** 
 [0.2339]*** [0.2374]** [0.0621]** 
 -0.4976 -0.2145 -0.0823 
Oil (0.3086) (0.2983) (0.0815) 
 [0.3094] [0.3138] [0.0837] 
 -0.6828 -0.2653 -0.2176 
Weapons & Equipment (0.7945) (0.7679) (0.2098) 
 [0.6163] [0.5581] [0.1703] 
 0.2238 0.2497 0.0657 
Inhuman Weapons (0.2084) (0.2014) (0.0550) 
 [0.2779] [0.2521] [0.0755] 
 -0.5837 -0.2007 -0.1794 
Corruption (0.4309) (0.4165) (0.1138) 
 [0.2549]** [0.2721] [0.0709]** 
Pollution (Omitted) (Omitted) (Omitted) 
 -0.2767 -0.0424 -0.1254 
Child Labour (0.4829) (0.4667) (0.1275) 
 [0.2683] [0.1768] [0.0767] 
 0.0988 -0.1487 0.0502 
Violated Labour Rights (0.3312) (0.3201) (0.0874) 
 [0.1173] [0.1153] [0.0359] 
 0.5195 -0.2697 0.1421 
Violated Human Rights (0.6600) (0.6379) (0.1743) 
 [0.5529] [0.4948] [0.1496] 
R2 0.6034 0.6105 0.7124 
Results from equation (5). Standard error in ( ), robust standard errors in [ ].  
Statistically significant at: *10 %, **5 %, *** 1 % 
 
 
The regression outputs show that excluding companies involved with revenues from the 
pornography industry has a positive impact and is statistically significant when regressed 
with Jensen’s alpha, Carhart’s alpha and the Sharpe ratio as dependent variables. The screen 
is statistically different from zero with regular and robust standard errors at the 1% level and 
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has a positive coefficient of 0.6488 when Jensen’s alpha is the measure of performance. This 
is an indication that funds excluding companies associated with the pornography industry on 
average had 0.65 percentage points higher abnormal monthly returns compared to those who 
did not exclude based on the screen pornography. The screen has a coefficient of 0.5077 
when regressed with Carhart’s alpha and is statistically significant with regular standard 
errors at 1% and at 5% with robust standard errors. As for the Sharpe ratio, the coefficient of 
0.1383 is also statistically significant with regular and robust standard errors at the 1% level 
and 5% level respectively. It seems unlikely however that the mutual funds would have a big 
enough exposure to those, apparently underperforming companies that it would have such a 
notable positive impact to exclude them. One should perhaps not put too much weight on the 
inference, it certainly is statistically significant but there could be a correlation with some 
other, unknown factor. 
 
Another individual screen that shows significant results is corruption. By excluding corrupt 
companies the abnormal performance of those socially responsible investment funds in the 
sample decreased. These results are statistically significant with robust standard errors at the 
5% level with Jensen’s alpha and the Sharpe ratio, with corresponding coefficients of -0.537 
and -0.1794.  
 
The abnormal performance was on average enhanced with a coefficient of 0.2372 when 
measured with the Sharpe ratio for those funds excluding tobacco companies from their 
investment strategy. The results are statistically significant with robust standard errors at the 
10% level. 
 
Even though most of the screens do not have a significant impact with a t-test, it is possible 
that they could have a joint significance and a F-test can show whether this is the case.  Two 
F-tests were performed, one test for the exclusion screens alcohol, tobacco, gambling, oil, 
weapons and inhuman weapons (pornography excluded as the screen is significant on its 
own), and one test for the norms-based screens corruption, pollution, child labour, violated 
labour rights and violated human rights. The exclusion screening test proved significant at the 
10 % level for Jensen’s alpha and the norms-based screening test was not significant. As for 
Carhart’s alpha and the Sharpe ratio, neither of the F-tests were significant.  
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4.3. Answering Hypotheses 
 
The hypotheses to answer are whether a statistically significant quadratic relationship exists 
between the number of negative screens and the three measurements of performance. The 
approach of supporting the assumption of an existing relationship is to reject the null 
hypothesis stating that a relationship does not exist, in other words, to show that the 
coefficients are different from zero.  
 
The regression model (6) is of interest, where performance was regressed on screening 
intensity and screening intensity squared in addition to the supplementary variables that are 
not relevant for hypothesis testing. The coefficient in model (6) for screening intensity is β1 
and the squared counterpart is represented by β2. The null hypothesis states that none of the 
variables have an effect on the corresponding performance measurements and is consequently 
specified as follows. 
 
 !!:!!! = !! = 0 ( 7 ) 
 
The alternative hypothesis states that the variables do have an effect on performance and is 
thus expressed as both screening intensity and screening intensity squared being different 
from zero. Note that both variables must be different from zero to allow for a quadratic 
effect; if only the linear screening intensity is significant the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected. 
 
 !!:!!! !≠ 0!!"#!!! ≠ 0 ( 8 ) 
 
When performing a F-test, the goodness-of-fit of the original model is compared to the 
goodness-of-fit when the variables of interest are removed from the regression model, in this 
case screening intensity and screening intensity squared. The t-tests performed when 
determining whether the variables screening intensity and screening intensity squared were 
significant on their own show that the null hypothesis can be rejected for both Jensen’s alpha 
and the Sharpe ratio and it is thus not necessary to examine the matter further with a F-test, as 
both of the variables were highly significant. However, it is of interest to assess at what level 
the null hypothesis of their joint impact can be rejected for Jensen’s alpha and the Sharpe 
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ratio as well as testing whether the two variables joint effect might be important for a well-
fitting model when Carhart’s alpha is the dependent variable, even though the individual t-
tests showed no significant relationship. The F-tests were done for each of the performance 
measurements – hypothesis I, II & III respectively, and returned a p-value, the probability of 
observing a value as extreme as we did if the null hypothesis is in fact true, which is the basis 
for our inferences. 
 
I. Jensen’s alpha - The null hypothesis is rejected at the 1 % significance level. 
The F-test shows with high confidence that screening intensity had a quadratic impact on 
Jensen’s alpha during the sample period. The chance of faulty rejecting the null hypothesis is 
less than 1 % and it is thus assumed that screening intensity has explanatory power and that 
the relationship is quadratic. 
 
II. Carhart’s alpha - The null hypothesis is not rejected. 
For Carhart’s alpha there is no clear evidence that screening intensity is of importance for 
modelling what has an effect on the abnormal return after the risk exposure to the market, 
company size, company book-to-market ratio and momentum has been accounted for. 
 
III. Sharpe ratio - The null hypothesis is rejected at the 5 % significance level. 
When the Sharpe ratio is the measure of performance and screening intensity and its squared 
counterpart are included as variables, the model’s goodness-of-fit and explanatory power is 
improved compared to when they are not included. There is less than 5 % chance of 
wrongfully stating that screening intensity’s effect on the Sharpe ratio is different from zero 
and that the relationship is quadratic. 
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5. DISCUSSION 
 
The results retrieved when using Jensen’s alpha and the Sharpe ratio as dependent variables 
indicate that portfolio managers aiming to achieve superior fund performance should ideally 
apply nine out of twelve applicable screening criteria. This is contradictory to the study by 
Barnett & Salomon (2006) in which a convex relationship was found, whereas regressions in 
this study resulted in a concave relationship. Their analysis stated that the funds are best off 
by either applying few screens, thus staying well diversified, or by applying many screens to 
truly gain the benefits derived from positive stakeholder relations.  
 
Reasons to why the relationship found in this study might differ from previous research can 
have numerous explanations. As the quantitative measurements of SRI differ from previous 
studies, the results are not completely comparable. The approach of using screening intensity 
is similar, however the screens that fund managers in different countries employ vary due to 
the demands of retail investors stemming from differences in culture and public opinion. In 
the United States for example, screens include animal testing, excessive pay, country 
exclusions and more. Among the Swedish mutual funds in “Hållbarhetsprofilen” there are no 
portfolio managers stating that they apply any of these constraints.  
 
Previous studies presented have had sample periods ranging from the 1980’s up until the 
early 21st century whereas this study covers the last three years, a shorter time period but 
more up to date. As ideals and opinions towards sustainability fluctuate over time, the 
companies SRI mutual funds invest in may experience time periods in which the public 
opinion is beneficial and more value is put on the Stakeholder advantages than at other times 
when the issue is not given as much attention. 
 
What separates Carhart’s four-factor alpha from Jensen’s alpha is that the additional factors 
of company size, book-to-market ratio and momentum have been taken into account when 
estimating abnormal return. The statistically significant relationship between abnormal return 
and screening intensity found for Jensen’s alpha is lost when the estimation model includes 
the additional factor premiums. In March 2011 – March 2014 screening intensity did not 
offer any assistance in seeking to discover superior performance when Carhart’s four-factor 
alpha is the measurement of performance. Since the abnormal return’s correlation with 
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screening intensity is not statistically significant once the three additional factors are 
considered, it is imaginable that the exclusion and norms-based screening criteria are 
correlated with one or more of those factors. Applying more screens is linked to a higher 
alpha when using the CAPM, but the reason might be that more screens actually lead the 
portfolio manager to select companies with smaller market caps, higher book-to-market ratios 
or companies with positive momentum and that it is in fact biases from those factors, and not 
some analytical edge, that generate the superior Jensen’s alpha.  
 
As for Jensen’s alpha and the Sharpe ratio, the null hypothesis that screening intensity and 
screening intensity squared do not have an impact, was rejected at the 1 % and the 5 % 
significance level respectively. According to portfolio theory, the funds with high levels of 
screening intensity, excluding many possible investment opportunities, should suffer from 
restricting the investable universe and not being fully diversified, thus deteriorating the 
chances of successful portfolio management. Mutual funds applying the least amount of 
constraints to their investment strategy should be better off at composing an optimal portfolio 
at the efficient frontier. By adding constraints, the minimum variance frontier will shift to a 
less optimal trade-off between risk and return and it is therefore according to portfolio theory 
suggested not to add more constraints to your portfolio than necessary.  
 
That more screens enhance performance up to the turning point at nine screens, even though 
portfolio theory discourages restrictions, could be explained in the light of stakeholder 
theory. A more intense screening process when composing the portfolio will lead to investing 
in more healthy companies that are in accordance with social norms and stakeholder values. 
If emotions do have an impact on decision-making as shown by behavioural economists, one 
could imagine that sin companies, which are corporations associated with exclusion criteria, 
are companies that could easily be the subject of strong negative emotions, consequently 
reducing market value as some investors do not wish to be associated with such businesses.  
 
Supposing that markets might not be fully efficient in its semi-strong form opens up for the 
possibility of profitable investment opportunities gained from superior asset analysis. 
Olivecrona and Eixmann at the Second AP Fund regard ESG analysis primarily as a tool for 
identifying the most cost efficient companies rather than solely as a tool for excluding sinful 
companies. Even though environmental, social and governance (ESG) considerations have 
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become common factors to consider in equity research, it is not a wild suggestion that SRI 
mutual funds incorporate ESG analysis to a wider extent than conventional mutual funds. 
Mutual funds with a higher number of screening criteria might have to be more scrutinising 
in the asset selection process, for analysts to discover whether a company respects labour 
rights, corruption laws or other norms-based criteria, they may have to perform a more 
rigorous analysis than to solely analysing financial data. 
 
As the positive effects of screening starts to decline after nine screens, one can reason that the 
positive effects derived from stakeholder theory starts to diminish and the negative effects 
derived from having a constringent pool of possible investments starts to dominate.   
 
There are some apparent contradictions in combining portfolio theory and stakeholder theory. 
The latter emphasises the possible gains to be derived from investing in companies with 
positive relations with stakeholders as the intrinsic value can be enhanced through constant 
improvements like the actions presented in Table 1, actions that are largely aimed at reducing 
company specific risks. Portfolio Theory primarily focuses on the covariance properties, as 
the company specific risks are diversified away and are therefore not relevant. However, the 
possible occasion for combining these two theories could be in that the covariance properties 
portfolio theory bases its assessments on are estimates of return, standard deviation and 
correlations and there are growing evidence that a detailed analysis incorporating stakeholder 
theory and ESG analysis can actually make those estimates more realistic and precise 
(Goldman Sachs, 2007). In the fast-paced and highly competitive financial markets 
unforeseen events are to be expected and it is likely that the covariance properties change. 
Even if company-specific risk is not of interest, it is reasonable to assume that the high-risk 
companies’ estimates suffer a higher probability of changing due to unforeseen events, for 
example litigation, reputational risk or conflicts of interest, which is where stakeholder theory 
can be used in proactive purposes.  
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6. CONCLUSION & OUTLOOK 
  
Studying and quantifying the common SRI practices led to the approach of reckoning 
categories of SRI-constraints, i.e. screens. From studying the performance of SRI mutual 
funds on the Swedish market over a three-year period a curvilinear relationship between risk 
and return was found. The regression analysis show that applying nine exclusion and norms-
based screens would have been the optimal screening intensity for an investor choosing a SRI 
mutual fund on the Swedish market in March 2011 – March 2014. 
  
For further research it would be interesting to quantify the mutual funds’ characteristics more 
thoroughly by evaluating the quality of their assessments and deeply examine whether fancy 
words are primarily a marketing trick or if the words are truly incorporated in the 
organisation. It is worth to bear in mind that social responsibility is a highly individual 
subject and what branches of responsible investing are the most valuable differ among 
people, which makes evaluating the plausible value of different SRI practices hard to assess. 
In regards to exclusion and norms-based screening, light has been shed on the optimal 
screening intensity, and a further analysis on individual criteria would be interesting for 
future research.   
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